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Note
Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman
Energy, Inc.: Aiding and Abetting Liability
Under the Alien Tort Statute
James Morrissey
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2001, the Presbyterian Church of Sudan and several
individuals filed suit in United States Federal Court against
Talisman Energy, Inc. (Talisman).1 The plaintiffs alleged that
Talisman was complicit in the Sudanese government’s human
rights abuses against largely non-Muslim Sudanese civilians
living in the area of the company’s oil concession.2 The plaintiffs
alleged that the Sudanese government orchestrated an armed
campaign of murder, rape and massive civilian displacement in
order to clear the way for oil exploration.3 On October 2, 2009,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued its
opinion in Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy,
Inc.4 Upholding the lower court’s ruling of summary judgment
in favor of defendant Talisman, the Second Circuit set a high
bar for plaintiffs who seek to use the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) to
1. Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 251
(2d Cir. 2009).
2. See id. at 248–51 (noting that civilians represented by plaintiff were living
in areas of land proximate to Talisman’s oil concession).
3. See David Glovin, Talisman Court Upholds Genocide Suit Dismissal,
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 2, 2009, 14:20EDT),
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601082&sid=av47UyrplgEQ
(linking
defendants’ alleged human rights violations to oil exploration); BUSINESS & HUMAN
RIGHTS RESOURCE CENTRE, Case Profile: Talisman Lawsuit (re Sudan),
http://www.businesshumanrights.org/Categories/Lawlawsuits/LLawsuitsregulatoryactio/LawsuitsSelecte
dcLaws/TalismanlawsuitreSudan (last visited Jan. 12, 2010) (listing alleged human
rights violations of Talisman).
4. Talisman, 582 F.3d at 244.
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hold foreign defendants accountable for aiding and abetting
violations of international law.5 The court determined that
Talisman could not be held liable for aiding and abetting
violations of international law committed by the Sudanese
government unless the plaintiffs could prove that Talisman
purposefully aided the government’s alleged human rights
violations.6
The pivotal issue in this case was determining the
appropriate mens rea standard for aiding and abetting liability
under customary international law, and therefore in ATS cases.7
The court’s holding on this issue is particularly important
because of the increasing use of the ATS as a means to bring
civil actions against corporate defendants alleging that they
have committed violations of international law in foreign
nations.8
This Comment seeks to show that the Second Circuit
incorrectly determined that aiding and abetting under
customary international law requires a mens rea of purpose
when, in fact, international law dictates that the requisite mens
rea standard is knowledge. Part I explains the events that
precipitated the plaintiffs’ cause of action in Talisman and
examines relevant sources of customary international law. Part
II details the Second Circuit’s decision and reasoning in
Talisman. Finally, Part III analyzes relevant sources of
international law and determines that customary international
law dictates a mens rea standard of knowledge for aiding and
abetting liability.

5.
6.
7.

See id. at 247–48, 259.
Id. at 247–48.
Cf. id. at 256–60 (evaluating the mens rea standard for aiding and abetting
in criminal liability and applying this analysis to international law norms).
8. See generally id. at 254–255 (noting that the ATS provided jurisdiction just
once in the 170 years after its enactment, but has been used increasingly in recent
decades).
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II. BACKGROUND
A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND OF PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH OF SUDAN
V. TALISMAN ENERGY, INC.
1.Conflict in the Sudan
The seeds of the turmoil in the Sudan—which ultimately
led to the plaintiffs’ claims in Presbyterian Church of Sudan v.
Talisman Energy, Inc.—were sown in 1956 when Sudan
obtained its independence from Britain and Egypt.9 Almost
immediately after achieving independence, civil war erupted
between the Arab-dominated government based in the north
and the non-Muslim African population of the south.10 In 1972,
the two sides made a deal to apportion control and a period of
relative peace ensued.11 However, this peace was shattered in
1983 when hostilities erupted anew between the government
and a southern rebel group named the Sudan People’s
Liberation Army (SPLA).12 In 1991, the SPLA splintered into
rival sects and fought the government as well as each other.13
Although the government and several of the southern rebel
groups were able to broker a peace agreement in 1997, by the
end of 2000 this agreement had collapsed and conflict
resumed.14 It is beyond question that during the course of
Talisman’s work in Sudan, the amount of violence in southern
Sudan substantially increased.15
2. Oil Development in the Sudan
In 1979, the petroleum company Chevron discovered a
significant quantity of oil in southern Sudan. 16 In order to
develop this lucrative resource, the Sudanese government
9. See Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244,
248 (2d Cir. 2009).
10. Talisman, 582 F.3d at 248; see also Presbyterian Church of Sudan v.
Talisman Energy, Inc. (Talisman I), 453 F.Supp.2d 633, 643 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)
(explaining in greater detail the civil wars after Sudan gained independence from
Egypt), aff’d 582 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2009).
11. Talisman, 582 F.3d at 248.
12. See Talisman I, 453 F.Supp.2d at 643.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. See Talisman, 582 F.3d at 248.
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granted rights to several foreign companies to develop six
“blocks” of territory.17 By 1996, four oil companies formed a
consortium that conducted business through a corporation
called the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company Limited
(GNPOC).18 In 1998, Talisman, a Canadian oil exploration
company, purchased one of these companies, Arakis Energy
Corporation (Arakis), thus acquiring a 25% stake in GNPOC.19
However, before beginning operations in Sudan, the head of
security for Arakis advised Talisman that its involvement would
tip the military power balance in favor of the government.20
3. Security Arrangements for GNPOC
From 1999 to 2003 the government military forces in Sudan
coordinated with GNOPC to provide security for the concession
area.21 Examples of GNOPC and government collaborative
efforts in the concession area included: the construction of roads
linking the concession areas to military bases,22 GNOPC
allowing the military to open garrisons within the concession,23
and GNOPC upgrading two airstrips on the concession named
Heglig and Unity.24 The military subsequently began using the
Heglig airstrip as a “staging area”25 for combat operations in the
surrounding territory, including offensive helicopter and bomber
attacks against civilians.26 Furthermore, GNPOC personnel at
both airports refueled military aircrafts, sometimes with

17. Id.; see also Talisman I, 453 F.Supp.2d at 643 (explaining in greater detail
Sudan’s process for granting development rights on the territory in question).
18. See Talisman, 582 F.3d at 248.
19. Id. at 248–49. See generally Talisman I, 453 F.Supp.2d at 647 (providing
relevant background information regarding the Talisman corporation).
20. Talisman, 582 F.3d at 249. The head of security for Arakis “advised
Talisman that the oil fields were protected both by the military and by Governmentsponsored militias” and “opined that, though Talisman’s assistance would greatly
advance oil exploration, it would tip the military balance in favor of the
Government.’”) See id.
21. Talisman I, 453 F.Supp.2d at 649.
22. Talisman, 582 F.3d at 249.
23. Talisman I, 453 F.Supp.2d at 650 (noting further that when a garrison was
constructed, local police forces were used and villages were abolished).
24. Talisman, 582 F.3d at 249–50.
25. Talisman I, 453 F.Supp.2d at 652.
26. See Talisman, 582 F.3d at 249–50 (noting that the airstrips were used by
the government for offensive attacks in the area); see also Talisman I, 453 F.Supp.2d
at 652 (stating that helicopters and bombers that refueled at Heglig were used by
the government in civilian attacks).
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GNPOC’s own fuel.27 In February of 2001, Talisman’s CEO, Jim
Buckee, wrote to the Sudanese Minister of National Defense
warning that the bombings being staged from the airstrips were
“universally construed as violations of international
humanitarian law” but later withdrew his objection to the
government’s use of the airstrips after a missile attack on a
GNPOC facility.28
To further secure the oil field operations, the military
created a “buffer zone” around GNPOC facilities by clearing key
areas of civilian populations.29 In order to create this buffer
zone, the military “forced people to leave villages by attacking
the villages with any means necessary, including small arms
fire, artillery, helicopter gunships and bombers.”30 Additionally,
the former chief of military intelligence for the Sudan People’s
Defense Force testified that the military “routinely attacked
undefended civilian villages in the GNPOC oil concession to
clear the area for oil exploration.”31 Internal Talisman reports
contain evidence that they were aware of these forced
displacements.32
In response to these forced displacements, those affected
sought to hold Talisman accountable. The plaintiffs in Talisman
are current and former residents of southern Sudan who claim
that they were victims of human rights abuses resulting from
these government attacks to secure the oil fields.33 They brought
suit against Talisman under the ATS,34 alleging that Talisman
aided and abetted the government in the perpetration of those
abuses.35

27.
28.

Talisman, 582 F.3d at 249–50.
Id. at 250 (stating that Buckee dropped his objections to the presence of
military helicopter gunships at Heglig).
29. Talisman I, 453 F.Supp.2d at 650.
30. Id.
31. Id. (noting that the former chief of military intelligence for the Sudan
People’s Defense Force was also the former chief of military intelligence for the
Southern Sudanese Defense Force).
32. See Talisman, 582 F.3d at 250 (noting a 2002 report by a Talisman
subsidiary concerning the buffer zone that stated “[t]he area within the security ring
road while not a sterile area as found on security operations elsewhere . . . is moving
in that direction.”).
33. Id. at 251.
34. See id. at 247. See generally Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
35. Talisman, 582 F.3d at 247–48 (noting that plaintiffs allege that Talisman
aided and abetted or conspired with the government with respect to human rights
abuses).
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B. HOLDING CORPORATIONS LIABLE FOR AIDING AND ABETTING
VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW UNDER THE ATS
The First Congress of the United States enacted the ATS as
part of the Judiciary Act in 1789.36 The text of the ATS states
that “[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any
civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of
the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”37 However,
this statute “quickly lapsed into desuetude.”38 In fact, for over
170 years after its enactment it only provided jurisdiction in one
case.39
1. The Supreme Court’s Decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain
The only time that the Supreme Court has construed the
meaning of the ATS is in the case Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.40 In
Sosa, a Mexican national brought a claim under the ATS
against the United States and another Mexican national,
Alvarez-Machain (Alvarez).41 The plaintiff alleged that Alvarez,
in conjunction with the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA),
unlawfully abducted him from Mexico and transported him to
the United States to stand trial for his alleged participation in
the torture and murder of a DEA agent.42
In determining the intention of the First Congress when it
enacted the ATS, the Court looked to the historical context of
the statute.43 The Court surmised that the inability of the
Continental Congress to “cause infractions of treaties or of the
law of nations to be punished” was the primary impetus for the
ATS.44 Ultimately, the Court determined that the drafters
36. William R. Casto, The Federal Courts’ Protective Jurisdiction Over Tort
Committed In Violation of the Law of Nations, 18 CONN. L. REV. 467, 467 (1986).
37. 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
38. Casto, supra note 36, at 468.
39. Sosa v. Alvarez–Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 712 (2004).
40. Talisman, 582 F.3d at 255.
41. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 697–698 (noting that the plaintiff brought suit
against another Mexican national, five Mexican civilians, four Drug Enforcement
Agency personnel and the United States).
42. Id.
43. See id. at 714–720 (discussing relevant historical happenings in foreign and
domestic affairs prior to the enactment of the ATS).
44. Id. at 716–717 (quoting JAMES MADISON, JOURNAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION 60 (E. Scott ed. 1893)) (“[T]his class of cases was intensified by the so
called Marbois incident of May1784, in which a French adventurer, De Longchamps,
verbally and physically assaulted the Secretary of the French Legion in
Philadelphia.”).
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understood the ATS to give federal courts jurisdiction over three
types of offenses against the law of nations: “violation of safe
conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and
piracy.”45 However, the Court was open to the possibility of new
causes of actions based on the “present day law of nations,” so
long as the claim is based on “a norm of international character
accepted by the civilized world and defined with a specificity
comparable [to the three causes of actions enumerated above].”46
Ultimately, the Court concluded that “the door is still ajar
subject to vigilant doorkeeping, and thus open to a narrow class
of international norms today.”47
2. Khulumani v. Barclay National Bank Ltd.48
Although the Supreme Court’s decision in Sosa made it
clear that federal courts have authority to recognize causes of
action based on modern interpretation of customary
international law, the Court’s decision offered little guidance as
to whether a defendant could be held liable for aiding and
abetting under the ATS.49 Another significant issue left
unresolved by the Court in Sosa was whether customary
international law or federal common law provided the
appropriate mens rea standard for aiding and abetting.50 In
Khulumani v. Barclay National Bank Ltd., the Second Circuit
attempted to resolve this very issue.51 The plaintiffs in
Khulumani brought claims under the ATS against
approximately fifty corporate defendants and hundreds of
corporate “Does” alleging that the defendants collaborated with
the government of South Africa in order to maintain the
apartheid system.52
The Second Circuit found in a per curium opinion that a
corporation can be sued under the ATS based on a theory of
aiding and abetting, and therefore denied the corporate

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. at 724.
Id. at 725 (alteration in original).
Sosa, 542 U.S. at 729.
Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007).
Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 286 (Hall, J., concurring).
Id. (“Sosa at best lends Delphian guidance on the question of whether the
federal common law or customary international represents the proper source from
which to derive a standard of aiding and abetting liability under the [ATS].”).
51. Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 275–77 (Katzmann, J., concurring).
52. Id. at 258 (per curium).

MORRISSEY

2011

Formatted - Fixed CDL

12/10/2010 2:13 PM

AIDING AND ABETTING LIABILITY UNDER THE ATS

151

defendant’s motion for summary judgment.53 However, the
panel split on which body of law, federal common law or
customary international law, governs the standard for aiding
and abetting.54 Two of the circuit judges found that
international law provided the standard for the scope of aiding
and abetting liability,55 while one judge determined that
domestic aiding and abetting laws should apply.56 In his
concurring opinion, Judge Katzmann surveyed various sources
of customary international law and concluded that there is “no
source of international law that recognizes liability for aiding
and abetting a violation of international law but would not
authorize imposition of such liability on a party who acts with
the purpose of facilitating that violation.57
Ultimately, a majority of the circuit panel in Khulumani
supported the conclusions that: (1) the appropriate source of an
aiding and abetting standard under the ATS is customary
international law and (2) in order to be liable for aiding and
abetting a violation of international law, it is necessary for a
defendant to purposefully facilitate the commission of the
crime.58
C. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ITS SOURCES
When the Supreme Court stated that a claim brought under
the ATS must be based on a “norm of international character
accepted by the civilized world and defined with a specificity
comparable to the [18th century paradigms recognized by the
Court in Sosa],” it was referring to customary international
law.59 Customary international law is law that “results from a
general and consistent practice of States followed by them from

53. Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 260. See also Doug Cassel, Corporate Aiding and
Abetting of Human Rights Violations: Confusion in the Courts, 6 NW. J. INT’L HUM.
RTS. 304, 320 (2008).
54. See Cassel, supra note 53, at 320–21 (explaining the schism between the
circuit judges).
55. See Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 269 (Katzman, J., concurring); id. at 330
(Korman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
56. Id. at 284 (Hall, J., concurring).
57. Id. at 277 (Katzman, J., concurring).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 267. See also Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc.,
582 F.3d 244, 255 (2d Cir. 2009) (“[W]e look primarily to the formal lawmaking and
official actions of States and only secondarily to the works of scholars as evidence of
the established practices of States.”) (quoting Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp.,
414 F.3d 233, 250 (2d Cir. 2003)).
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a sense of legal obligation.”60 State practice can take many
forms, including “treaties and executive agreements, decisions of
international and national courts and tribunals and decisions,
declarations and resolutions of international organizations.”61
Likewise, Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice articulates several sources of customary international
law a court should consider in determining what constitutes
international law.62 These sources of law are:
- international conventions, whether general or particular,
establishing rules expressly recognized by the
contesting states;
- international custom, as evidence of a general practice
accepted as law;
- the general principles of law recognized by civilized
nations;
subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decision and
the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the
various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of
the rules of law.63
Therefore, in order to determine the appropriate mens rea
standard for aiding and abetting, it is necessary to examine
these sources of international law.64
D. SOURCES OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW REGARDING
AIDING AND ABETTING LIABILITY
1. International Tribunals
a. Post World War II Trials at Nuremburg
Following World War II, the Allies established the
International Military Tribunal at Nuremburg (Nuremburg
Tribunal) and similar tribunals to hold those individuals
responsible for violations of international law accountable. 65
60. JEFFREY L. DUNOFF, STEVEN R. RATNER & DAVID WIPPMAN, INTERNATIONAL
LAW NORMS, ACTORS PROCESS: A PROBLEM-ORIENTED APPROACH 78 (2d ed. 2006)
(quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES).
61. Id. at 79.
62. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59
Stat. 1055, 1060.
63. Id.
64. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880 (citing United States v. Smith, 18
U.S. 153, 160–61 (1820).
65. Kyle Rex Jacobson, Doing Business with the Devil: The Challenges of

MORRISSEY

2011

Formatted - Fixed CDL

12/10/2010 2:13 PM

AIDING AND ABETTING LIABILITY UNDER THE ATS

153

The charter of the Nuremburg Tribunal was heralded as an
authoritative statement of international law and the United
Nations General Assembly later affirmed the principles of the
charter and judgments of the Nuremburg Tribunal as definitive
expressions of customary international law.66
In addition to recognizing individual responsibility for
complicity in war crimes,67 Allied prosecutors also sought to hold
corporate executives liable for their role as accomplices.68 The
most notable of these cases was the Zyklon B case in which
German industrialists were held accountable as accomplices for
selling insecticide used to kill prisoners held in concentration
camps.69 The Nuremburg Tribunal thus established the first
notion that corporate officers could be held liable for the actions
of the corporation as an accomplice to violations of international
law and the appropriate standard for assessing guilt for such a
crime.70
b. The ICTY and ICTR
Following World War II there were few opportunities for an
international tribunal to develop customary law regarding
aiding and abetting liability.71 However, this changed when the
United Nations Security Council created the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)72 and the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)73 in the
early 1990s to address the serious violations of international law
which occurred in these States. The tribunals’ statutory
provisions intended to “codify existing norms of customary
Prosecuting Corporate Officials Whose Business Transactions Facilitate War Crimes
and Crimes Against Humanity, 56 A.F. L. REV. 167, 169–70 (2005).
66. Id. at 170.

67. See 4 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY
TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, at 572–73 (1949).
68. Jacobson, supra note 65, at 174–75.
69. Cassel, supra note 53, at 308.
70. See id. at 306–07.
71. Jacobson, supra note 65, at 200. See also Paul Mysliwiec, Comment,
Accomplice to Genocide Liability: The Case for a Purpose Mens Rea Standard, 10
CHI. J. INT’L L. 389, 392 (2009) (describing how there were almost no prosecutions
for genocide from the passage of the Genocide convention to the founding of the
ICTY and ICTR).
72. U.N. Secretary General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to
Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), 36, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May
3, 1993), adopted by S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993).
73. S.C. Res. 955, annex, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994).
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international law” while the tribunals’ jurisdiction limited it to
just enforcing these norms.74 Both the ICTY and ICTR ascribe
criminal liability for anyone who “aided and abetted in the
planning, preparation or execution” of genocide, war crimes, or
crimes against humanity.75 Furthermore, both the ICTY and
ICTR have produced decisions regarding the appropriate mens
rea standard for aiding and abetting.76
2. International Instruments: The ILC Draft Code and the Rome
Statue of the International Criminal Court
The United Nations created the International Law
Commission (ILC) in 1947 for the “promotion of the progressive
development of international law and its codification.”77 The
members of the ILC are persons of “recognized competence in
international law.”78 In the 1996 Draft Code of Crimes Against
the Peace and Security of Mankind (Draft Code), the ILC
clarifies what the international law standards are for “crimes
under international law and punishable as such.”79
The ICTY and ICTR were precursors to the International
Criminal Court (ICC) created by the Rome Statute.80 The
74. Cassel, supra note 53, at 307 (quoting The Secretary-General, Report of the
Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808, ¶ 29,
U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 3, 1993)). See also YUSUF AKSAR, IMPLEMENTING
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: FROM THE AD HOC TRIBUNALS TO A
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 3 (2004) (“[T]he ICTY and the ICTR
have to apply the customary rules of international humanitarian law as far as the
substantive law of the International Tribunal (in particular, the rules governing war
crimes, the crime of genocide and crimes against humanity) are concerned.”).
75. Id. (citing U.N. Secretary General, Report of the Secretary-General
Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), art.7.1, U.N.
Doc. S/25704 (May 3, 1993); S.C. Res. 955, supra note 73, art. 7.1.)
76. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT–95–17/1–T, Trial Chamber
Judgment, ¶236–49 (Dec.10, 1998),
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/40276a8a4.pdf; Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case
No. ICTR–96–4–T, Judgment (Sept. 2, 1998),
http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case%5CEnglish%5CAkayesu%5Cjudgement%5Cak
ay001.pdf.
77. Statute of the International Law Commission, art. 1 (Nov. 21, 1947),
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/statute/statute_e.pdf.
78. Id. at art. 2, ¶ 1.
79. Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, art. 1, ¶2
(1996), [hereinafter Draft Code],
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/English/draft%20articles/7_4_1996.pdf.
80. United Nations Diplomatic Conference on Plenipotentiaries on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, June 15–July 17, Rome Statute
of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 [Rome Statute].
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purpose of the ICC is to ensure that “the most serious crimes of
concern to the international community as a whole . . . not go
unpunished.”81 The jurisdiction of the ICC is complementary to
national courts. As such, it only has jurisdiction over a matter
when “national justice systems are unwilling or unable to do
so.”82 The Rome Statute specifically prescribes criminal
responsibility for an individual who aids or abets a war crime,
crime against humanity, or genocide.83
3. State Practice
As discussed above, the general principals of law
“recognized by civilized nations” play a crucial role in the
formation of customary international law.84 In order to
determine the proper mens rea standard for aiding and abetting
under international law, it is helpful to assess the practice of
other States, especially those which ascribe aiding and abetting
liability for violations of international law. This Comment will
examine the practices of several States infra part III(D).
III. THE SECOND CIRCUIT DECISION IN PRESBYTERIAN
CHURCH OF SUDAN V. TALISMAN ENERGY, INC.
In Talisman, the Second Circuit analyzed the various
sources of customary international law discussed above in order
to determine the appropriate mens rea standard for aiding and
abetting liability.85 According to the Second Circuit, the
“decisive issue” was whether liability for aiding and abetting
human rights violations “can be imposed absent a showing of
purpose” under customary law and, hence, an action brought
under the ATS.86
The Second Circuit’s analysis of the appropriate mens rea
standard relied primarily on the concurring opinion of Judge
Katzmann in Khulumani.87 The court quotes Judge Katzmann’s
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. at Preamble.
Cassel, supra note 53, at 316 (citing Rome Statute, supra note 80 art. 17).
Rome Statute, supra note 80, at art. 25.
See Rome Statute, supra note 80, at art. 38.
Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 258–
59 (2d Cir. 2009) (finding that the Court’s decision in Sosa establishes the “principle
that the scope of liability for ATS violations should be derived from international
law”).
86. Id. at 255.
87. Id. at 255.
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statement that his research revealed no source of international
law that would not impose liability for a mens rea of purposeful
assistance.88 In reliance on Judge Katzmann’s opinion, the
Court observed that “the purpose standard has been largely
upheld in the modern era, with only sporadic forays in the
direction of a knowledge standard,”89 and ultimately, concluded
that “the mens rea standard for aiding and abetting liability in
ATS actions is purpose rather than knowledge.”90
After deciding that the proper mens rea standard for aiding
and abetting is purpose, the court applied this standard to the
facts of the case.91 First, the court held that “[e]ven if Talisman
built roads or improved the airstrips with the intention that the
military would also be accommodated,” the evidence of such
coordination with the military “supports no inference of a
purpose to aid atrocities.”92 Second, the court held that the
plaintiffs did not allege the forced displacement of populations
to be a violation of international law.93 The court further noted
that such displacements may not constitute a violation of
international law “because a government has power to regulate
use of land and resources.”94
Furthermore, the court noted that it is “not enough for
plaintiffs to establish Talisman’s complicity in depopulating
areas . . . plaintiffs must establish that Talisman acted with the
purpose [of assisting] the Government’s violations of customary
international law.”95 Thus, because the court found that
Talisman did not purposefully aid the government in the
perpetration of crimes against humanity, it affirmed the district

88.
89.

Id. at 258.
Id. at 259 (citing Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 276 (Katzmann, J., concurring)).
The Court explains “sporadic forays” by noting that “some international criminal
tribunals have made overtures toward a knowledge standard” but the Rome Statute
of the International Criminal Court adopts a purpose standard. Id.
90. Id. at 259.
91. Id. at 260–64.
92. Id. at 262. See also id. (“Talisman helped build all–weather roads and
improved airports, notwithstanding awareness that this infrastructure might be
used for attacks on civilians.”).
93. Id. at 263. (“Plaintiffs . . . do not allege that such displacement in itself is a
violation of international law.”)
94. Id. Earlier in the opinion, however, the court accepts a definition of crimes
against humanity as: “murder, enslavement, deportation or forced transfer, torture,
rape or other inhumane acts, committed as part of a widespread [or] systematic
attack directed against civilian populations.” Id. at 257 (emphasis added) (quoting
Talisman I, 453 F.Supp.2d at 670).
95. Id. at 263.
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court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Talisman.96
IV. ANALYSIS
A. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW PROVIDES THE BASIS FOR
DETERMINING INTERNATIONAL CUSTOMARY LAW FOR THE
PURPOSES OF CIVIL PROCEEDINGS UNDER THE ATS
When ascertaining the scope of liability for a corporate
defendant in a civil claim brought pursuant to the ATS, it is
appropriate for courts to derive the applicable liability standard
from international criminal law.97 ATS case law does not
support the proposition that sources of international criminal
law must be ignored for purposes of establishing civil liability
under the ATS.98 To the contrary, several cases specifically look
to international criminal norms to ascertain the scope of civil
liability.99 Furthermore, in international law there is not a
“hermetic seal” between criminal and civil law.100 Justice Breyer
noted this fact in his concurring opinion in the Sosa case when
he stated that “the criminal courts of many nations combine
civil and criminal proceedings, allowing those injured by
criminal conduct to be represented, and to recover damages, in
the criminal proceeding itself.”101 Additionally, because
96.
97.

Id. at 247–48.
Compare Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 268–269
(Katzmann, J., concurring) (defining scope of liability under ATS by reference
international law, rather than federal common law) with id. at 286 (Hall, J.,
concurring) (using federal common law to define ATS liability).
98. See Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 270 n.5 (criticizing the holding of the lower
court that international criminal law was not a proper source for determining a civil
standard under the ATS).
99. See id.; see also Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 241–243 (2d Cir. 1995)
(relying upon a United Nations Declaration and other instruments stating that
genocide was a crime under international law. The court also relies on the
Nuremberg trials to establish individual liability for war crimes, notwithstanding
that the Nuremburg trails were criminal proceedings); Filartiga v. Pena–Irala, 630
F.2d 876, 882–883 (2d Cir. 1980) (analyzing the Declaration on the Protection of All
Persons from Being Subject to Torture, G.A. Res. 3452 (XXX), U.N. GAOR, 30th
Sess., Supp. No. 34, U.N. Doc. A/1034, at 91 (December 9, 1975), which requires
states to initiate criminal proceedings if it appears that torture has been committed,
in a case brought under the ATS).
100. Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 270 n.5. See also Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d
932, 949 (9th Cir. 2002) (“International human rights law has been developed
largely in the context of criminal prosecutions rather than civil proceedings.”),
vacated 395 F.3d. 978, appeal dismissed per stipulation, 403 F.3d 708.
101. Sosa v. Alvarez–Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 762–63 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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customary international law is typically enforced through
domestic legal regimes, it is the prerogative of the national legal
system to decide whether to enforce this law “through criminal
prosecutions, civil liability, or administrative remedies.”102
Therefore, customary international law norms of criminal law
provide the appropriate basis upon which to base a standard for
determining civil liability under the ATS.
B. DECISIONS OF INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS REGARDING AIDING
AND ABETTING LIABILITY
1. Nuremburg Trials
In Talisman, the Second Circuit stated that “international
law at the time of the Nuremburg trials recognized aiding and
abetting liability only for purposeful conduct.”103 However, this
assertion is patently erroneous. In fact, the standard established
in the cases prosecuting German war criminals at Nuremburg
clearly establish, in aggregate, that liability for war crimes and
genocide can result from “knowingly providing substantial
assistance in the commission of these crimes.”104 Moreover, this
knowledge test was not merely limited to military defendants.105
102. Brief of Amicus Curiae International Human Rights Organizations and Bar
Associations in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 23, Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l
Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007) (No. 05–2141–cv) [hereinafter Brief Amicus
Curiae International Rights Organizations] (citing Beth Stephens, Translating
Filártiga: A Comparative and International Law Analysis of Domestic Remedies for
International Human Rights Violations, 27 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 (2002)). See also Brief
Amicus Curiae of International Law Scholars Philip Alston et al. in Support of
Appellants at 1–2, Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir.
2007) (No. 05–2141–cv) [hereinafter Brief Amicus Curiae of International Law
Scholars] (stating that “[i]nternational legal norms do not specify the means of their
domestic enforcement . . . the cause of action under the [ATS] is a creature of the
common law, not the law of nations per se.”).
103. Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 259
(citing The Ministries Cases). See United States v. von Weizsaecker (The Ministries
Cases), 14 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBURG MILITARY TRIBUNALS
UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, 622 (1949) (“[I]s it a crime to make a loan,
knowing or having good reason to believe that the borrower will us [sic] the funds in
financing enterprises which are employed in using labor in violation of . . .
international law? Does he stand in any different position than one who sells
supplies or raw materials to a builder building a house, knowing that the structure
will be used for an unlawful purpose? . . . [W]e are not prepared to state that such
loans constitute a violation of that law, nor has our attention been drawn to any
ruling to the contrary.”).
104. Brief Amicus Curiae of International Law Scholars, supra note 102, at 17.
105. See Trial of Bruno Tesch and Two Others (The Zyklon B Case), 1 LAW
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The Nuremburg Tribunal clearly accepted a knowledge
standard for corporate officers tried for their actions aiding the
Nazis. This fact is demonstrated by three cases. First, in the
trial against German industrialists who were in charge of the
I.G. Farben chemical company, the Nuremburg Tribunal
unambiguously adopted a knowledge standard.106 In this case,
the defendants were indicted on multiple charges, including
crimes against peace, plunder of private property and crimes
against humanity for their role in rearming the German
army.107 For both of these counts the Nuremburg Tribunal used
personal knowledge as the touchstone in determining the
liability of the defendants.108 Although the Nuremburg Tribunal
found that the defendants did not have sufficient knowledge of
the German war plans to ascribe liability for crimes against
peace,109 it found that individuals in the company had
knowingly participated in acts of plunder and spoliation.110 The

REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 101 (1947) (“The essential question was
whether the accused knew of the purpose to which their gas was being put . . . .
Prosecuting Counsel . . . concluded that, by supplying gas, knowing that it was to be
used for murder, [the owner of the gas-supplying firm, his second in command, and
the first gassing technician] had made themselves accessories before the fact to that
murder.”).
106. Trial of Carl Krauch and Twenty Two Others (The I.G. Farben Trial), 10
LAW REPORTS OF THE TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 52 (1948) (“[O]ne may not utilize
the corporate structure to achieve an immunity from criminal responsibility for
illegal acts which he directs, counsels, aids, orders, or abets. But the evidence must
establish action of the character we have indicated, with knowledge of the essential
elements of the crime.’”)
107. See Jacobson, supra note 65, at 178–86.
108. See id. at 183 (“To be convicted, the corporate official that authorized an
illegal action had to know those essential elements of the authorized act which give
it its criminal character . . . this means positive knowledge that the owner is being
deprived of his property against his will during military occupancy.”) (citation
omitted); id. at 179; The I.G. Farben Trial, 10 LAW REPORTS OF THE TRIALS OF WAR
CRIMINALS 36 (1948) (“[P]articipation in the rearmament of Germany was not a
crime on the part of any of the defendants in this case, unless that rearmament was
carried out, or participated in, with knowledge that it was a part of a plan or was
intended to be used in waging aggressive war.) But see The I.G. Farben Trial, 10
Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals 44 (defining civilian plunderers under a
military occupation as principles, not accessories, to a violation of international law)
(“Where private individuals . . . exploit the military occupancy by acquiring private
property against the will and consent of the former owner, such action . . . is in
violation of international law.”)
109. See The I.G. Farben Trial, 10 LAW REPORTS OF THE TRIALS OF WAR
CRIMINALS 36–37 (1948) (“If we were trying military experts, and it was shown that
they had knowledge of the extent of rearmament, such a conclusion might be
justified.”); see also Jacobson, supra note 65 at 183.
110. See Jacobson, supra note 65 at 183.
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Nuremburg Tribunal unequivocally stated that the basis of
liability for aiding and abetting actions of the principal was
knowledge that their actions furthered the atrocities that were
committed when it stated that the acts of “Farben and its
representatives . . . cannot be differentiated from the acts of
plunder or pillage committed by officers, soldiers, or public
officials of the German Reich.”111
Second, in United States v. Flick, commonly known as The
Flick Case,112 two German industrialists were charged with
aiding the activities of the SS through monetary contributions to
Himmler.113 The Nuremburg Tribunal, after first affirming the
criminal character of the SS in light of its responsibility for
atrocities, held that “[o]ne who knowingly by his influence and
money contributes to the support thereof must, under settled
legal principles, be deemed to be, if not a principal, certainly an
accessory to such crimes.”114 Thus, the Nuremburg Tribunal
recognized aiding and abetting liability for merely contributing
funds to an organization which the defendants knew was
committing violations of settled international law.115
The Nuremburg Tribunal’s reasoning in the Zyklon B case
is especially important in the context of ATS litigation, where a
corporation is almost always the defendant.116 The Zyklon B
111. The I.G. Farben Trial, 10 LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 50
(1948).
112. United States v. Flick (The Flick Case), 6 TRIAL OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE
THE NURENBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, 1
(1952).
113. Id. at 1216, 1218–20.
114. Id. at 1217.The Nuremburg Tribunal then explained that “there can be no
force in the argument that when, from 1939 on, these two defendants were
associated with Himmler and through him with the SS they could not be liable
because there had been no statute nor judgment declaring SS a criminal
organization and incriminated those who were members or in other manner
contributed to its support.” Id. at 1217. The defendants argued that they were not
aware of such activities and that they believed that the finds they contributed to
Himmler were used only to fund his “cultural hobbies.” Id at 1219. Nevertheless, the
Nuremburg Tribunal finds that the criminal character of the SS “must have been
known.” Id at 1220.
115. See id. at 1216–17, 1218–19.
116. See, e.g., Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d
244 (2d Cir. 2009); Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir.
2007); Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233 (2d Cir. 2003); Doe I v.
Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 949 (9th Cir. 2002), vacated 395 F.3d. 978, appeal
dismissed per stipulation, 403 F.3d 708; Bigio v. Coca–Cola Co., 239 F.3d 440 (2d
Cir. 2000). But see Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 06–4800–cv, 2010 WL
3611392 (2d Cir. Sept., 17, 2010) (holding that corporations are not liable under the
ATS)
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case illustrates the inherent problem of using a purpose
standard when assessing liability for defendants whose ultimate
aim is profit, but this profit is pursued by aiding severe human
rights abuses. In this case, the owner and two employees of a
company that produced Zyklon B gas were charged with war
crimes for supplying the poisonous gas which was used in the
mass execution of people in concentration camps.117 The
prosecution:
did not attempt to prove that the accused acted with the intention of
assisting the killing of the internees. It was accepted that their
purpose was to sell insecticide to the SS . . . The charge as accepted by
the court was that they knew what the buyer in fact intended to do
with the product they were supplying.118

The fact that two of the defendants in the Zyklon B case
were ultimately convicted based on their knowledge of how of
the gas was to be used is unequivocal evidence that the
Nuremburg Tribunal accepted knowledge as an appropriate
basis upon which aiding and abetting liability could be
ascribed.119
Unfortunately, these cases are wholly overlooked by the
Second Circuit in its Talisman decision despite the factual
similarity of these cases and Talisman. For instance, it is
arguable that allowing the government to use the corporation’s
airports as rally points in the orchestration of armed attacks
against civilians and providing other support for such
activities120 is analogous to providing gas for use on prisoners in
concentration camps or supporting an organization that is
known to commit atrocities through monetary contributions.
Additionally, as the reasoning of the Nuremburg Tribunal in
Zyklon B seems to suggest, the use of a purpose mens rea
standard for corporate defendants is unworkable because the
ostensible purpose of a business will almost always be the
pursuit of profits and not to aid the government in the
117.
118.

See Jacobson, supra note 65, at193–96.
Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT–95–17/1–T, Trial Chamber
Judgment, ¶ 238 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998) , aff’d,
Case No. IT–95–17/1–A (July 21, 2001) (asserting without citation).
119. See Jacobson, supra note 65, at 195. Contra id. at 194–95 (quoting Trial of
Bruno Tesch and Two Others (The Zyklon B Case), 1 LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF
WAR CRIMINALS 107 (1947)) (“If [defendant] were not in such a position [“to
influence the transfer of gas to Auschwitz or to prevent it”], no knowledge of the use
to which the gas was being put could make him guilty.”).
120. See supra Part I.A.3.
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commission of war crimes.121
Based on the foregoing examples, the Nuremburg Tribunal
unambiguously ascribed aiding and abetting liability to both
military and civilian defendants based on a knowledge
standard, and even went as far as inferring knowledge of the
principal’s criminal intent in certain situations.122 Therefore, the
Second Circuit patently erred in its finding that the Nuremburg
Tribunal only recognized aiding and abetting liability for actions
undertaken with the purpose of providing substantial assistance
in accomplishing its criminal objective.123
2. ICTY and ICTR Decisions
In his concurring opinion in Khulumani, Judge Katzmann
acknowledged in a footnote that decisions of the ICTY and ICTR
have accepted a mens rea standard of knowledge for aiding and
abetting liability.124 Nevertheless, Judge Katzmann argues that
this standard has not reached the same “level of consensus as
the 18th-century crimes identified by the Supreme Court in
Sosa.”125 However, as demonstrated below, the great weight of
ICTY and ICTR decisions on individual responsibility for aiding
and abetting consistently find that the customary international
121. See Beth Stevens, The Amorality of Profit: Transnational Corporations and
Human Rights, 20 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 45, 46 (2002) (“Profit-maximization, if not
the only goal of all business activity, is certainly central to the endeavor. And the
pursuit of profit is, by definition, an amoral goal –– not necessarily immoral, but
rather morally neutral.”).
122. See Trial of Bruno Tesch and Two Others (The Zyklon B Case), 1 LAW
REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 101 (1947) (“The essential question was
whether the accused knew of the purpose to which their gas was being put
. . . . Prosecuting Counsel . . . concluded that, by supplying gas, knowing that it was
to be used for murder, the three accused had made themselves accessories before the
fact to that murder.”); The I.G. Farben Case, 10 LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR
CRIMINALS 16 (1948).(“In these circumstances the question arose whether the
accused could be shown to have had personal knowledge of the criminal intentions of
the German Government to wage aggressive wars and, if so, whether they were
parties to the plan or conspiracy, or, knowing, of the plan, furthered its purpose and
objective by participating in the preparation for aggressive war. The Prosecution in
their attempt to prove the existence of such knowledge and active participation,
drew attention to the high positions held by the accused as well as to a great number
of facts and circumstances from which such knowledge and participation in their
view may be inferred.”).
123. See Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244,
259.
124. Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 276 n.12 (2d Cir.
2007).
125. Id. at 277 n.12.
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law standard is knowledge, not purpose. Furthermore, because
these tribunals are only empowered to apply standards that are
indisputably part of customary international law, their
judgments should be given significant deference in ascertaining
appropriate aiding and abetting standards.126
a. ICTY
In Prosecutor v. Tadic, the ICTY acknowledged that the
scope of its power is limited to applying international law that is
“beyond any doubt customary law.”127 Pursuant to this mandate,
the ICTY reviewed many different sources of customary
international law to determine the appropriate standard for
aiding and abetting liability.128 Ultimately, the mens rea
standard which the tribunal determined to be beyond any doubt
customary law is conduct by the defendant when he “knowingly
participated in the commission of an offense that violates
international humanitarian law and his participation directly
and substantially affected the commission of that offence . . . He
will also be responsible for all that naturally results from the
commission of the act in question.”129
In Prosecutor v. Furundzija, the Trial Chamber was once
more required to determine the appropriate mens rea for aiding
and abetting liability.130 In this case, the tribunal yet again
reviewed pertinent international law131 and concluded that:
[I]t is not necessary for the accomplice to share the mens rea of
the perpetrator in the sense of positive intention to commit the crime.
126.

See Brief Amicus Curiae of International Law Scholars, supra note 102, at

18.

127. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT–94–1–T, Opinion and Judgment of the
Trial Chamber, ¶ 662 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997)
(quoting U.N. Secretary–General, Report of the Secretary–General pursuant to
paragraph 2 of Security Council resolution 808 (1993) and Annex thereto, ¶ 34, U.N.
Doc. S/25704 (May 3, 1993)).
128. The tribunal finds the decisions of the Nuremburg tribunals to be
particularly persuasive but also analyzes the Code Penal, used in the French war
crimes trial after World War II, and the International Law Draft Code. Id. at ¶¶
663–69, 668.
129. Id. at ¶ 692.
130. Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT–95–17/1–T, Trial Chamber
Judgment, ¶ 245 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998), aff’d,
Case No. IT–95–17/1–A (July 21, 2001).
131. Here the Tribunal again finds the decisions of the Nuremburg tribunals to
be persuasive and also takes into account the ILC’s Draft Code on Crimes and
Offences Against Mankind and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court. Id. ¶ 236–243.
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Instead, the clear requirement in the vast majority of the cases is for
the accomplice to have knowledge that his actions will assist the
perpetrator in the commission of the crime.132

If, after reviewing the relevant sources of customary law,
the ICTY determined that the “vast majority” of the sources
impose liability for aiding and abetting based on a mens rea
standard of knowledge, there seems to be little support for
Judge Katzmann’s assertion that such a standard has not
reached the same level of consensus as the 18th—century
crimes identified in Sosa for the purpose of ATS litigation.133
Likewise, in Prosecutor v. Vasiljević, the Appeals Chamber
of the ICTY weighed in on the issue of the requisite mens rea for
aiding and abetting liability.134 The ICTY found that aiding and
abetting the commission of a crime is typically considered a
lesser degree of individual culpability than actually perpetrating
the crime and thus a broader mens rea than purpose is
appropriate.135 Therefore, in the case of aiding and abetting, the
“requisite mental element is knowledge that the acts performed
by the aider and abettor assist the commission of the specific
crime of the principal.”136
The Vasiljević case confirms that the ICTY has conclusively
adopted a knowledge standard for aiding and abetting,
reflecting the ICTY’s belief that this standard is beyond any
doubt the customary law standard. Furthermore, the Vasiljević
case, along with several other ICTY cases adopting the mens rea
standard of knowledge for aiding and abetting, were decided
after the Rome Statute of the ICC was adopted.137 In fact, the
132. Id. ¶ 245. See also id. ¶ 246 (“[I]t is not necessary that the aider and abettor
should know the precise crime that was intended and which in the event was
committed.”).
133. See Sosa v. Alvarez–Machain, 542 U.S. 725 (2004) (“[C]ourts should require
any claim based on the present–day law of nations to rest on a norm of international
character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a specificity comparable
th
to the features of the 18 –century paradigms we have recognized.”)
134. Prosecutor v. Vasiljević, Case No. IT–98–32–A, Appeal Chamber Judgment,
(Int’l Crim. Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia Feb 25, 2004).
135. See id. ¶102
136. Id.
137. See id.; Prosecutor v. Blagojevic, Case No. IT–02–60–T, Trial Chamber
Judgment, ¶ 782 (Jan. 17, 2005) (“An individual may be held responsible for aiding
and abetting genocide if it is shown that he assisted in the commission of the crime
in the knowledge of the principle perpetrator’s specific intent.”); Prosecutor v. Krstić,
Case No. IT–98–33–A, Appeals Judgment, ¶¶ 134–43 (Apr. 19, 2004) (vacating
Krstić’s conviction for taking part in a joint criminal enterprise but imposing
liability for aiding and abetting because “Krstić was aware of the intent to commit

MORRISSEY

2011

Formatted - Fixed CDL

12/10/2010 2:13 PM

AIDING AND ABETTING LIABILITY UNDER THE ATS

165

tribunal specifically referenced the Rome Statute in
Vasiljević.138 This is significant because Judge Katzmann and
the Second Circuit in Talisman rely heavily on the fact that the
Rome Statute seemingly mandates a purpose standard for
aiding and abetting liability.139 However, the ICTY specifically
rejected purpose as the required mens rea even after the Rome
Statute’s enactment.140 This fact greatly undermines the Second
Circuit’s reliance on that instrument in Talisman.
b. ICTR
The ICTR also addressed the issue of the appropriate mens
rea standard for aiding and abetting in Prosecutor v.
Akayesu.141 There, the ICTR concluded that an individual can be
held liable for aiding and abetting crimes against humanity if he
“knowingly aided or abetted or instigated one or more persons in
the commission of genocide, while knowing that such a person or
persons were committing genocide.”142 Furthermore, the
tribunal explained that aiding and abetting are two separate
types of offenses and that a defendant can be held liable for
either when it stated that “aiding means giving assistance to
someone. Abetting, on the other hand, would involve facilitating
the commission of an act by being sympathetic thereto . . .
[E]ither aiding or abetting alone is sufficient to render the
perpetrator criminally liable.”143
Additionally, the aider and abettor would not need to
knowingly provide aid with the desire that a crime occur in
order to be held liable.144 Even if the aider and abettor did not
wish for the crime to occur, or even regrets that it has occurred,

genocide . . . and with that knowledge, he did nothing to prevent the use of the Drina
Corps personnel and resources to facilitate those killings.”).
138. See Vasiljević, IT–98–32–A ¶ 102 (discussing how the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court distinguishes between a common criminal plan or
enterprise and aiding and abetting).
139. Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 259
(2d Cir. 2009) (discussing the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court).
140. See Vasiljević, IT–98–32–A ¶ 102.
141. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR–96–4–T, Judgement (Sept. 2, 1998),
http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case%5CEnglish%5CAkayesu%5Cjudgement%5Cak
ay001.pdf.
142. Id. ¶ 545.
143. Id. ¶ 484.
144. Id. ¶ 539 ([A]nyone who knowing of another’s criminal purpose, voluntarily
aids him or her in it, can be convicted of complicity even though he regretted the
outcome of the offence.”).
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he or she is liable if they were willing to aid the principal for
other motives.145 This standard should be particularly applicable
to corporations because the corporation may not wish for the
violations of international law to occur but may be more willing
to knowingly aid the principal in pursuit of profits or other
favorable concessions.
3. The ILC Draft Code and Rome Statute
The ILC Draft Code, promulgated in 1996, was considered
persuasive in several of the ICTY decisions in which the
tribunal attempted to determine the appropriate mens rea
standard for aiding and abetting liability in international law.146
Moreover, the ICTY deemed the ILC Draft Code an
“authoritative international instrument.”147 The ILC Draft code
specifically addresses the mens rea standard for aiding and
abetting in Article 25.148 Article 25 states that a person will be
responsible for a violation of international law if that person
“[k]nowingly aids, abets or otherwise assists, directly and
substantially, in the commission of such a crime, including
providing the means for its commission.”149 Despite the fact that
the ILC Draft Code clearly lays out the requisite mens rea
standard required for aiding and abetting liability and has had
a significant authoritative influence, particularly in the ICTY,
neither Judge Katzmann nor the Second Circuit even consider
the Draft Code in their analysis.150
Only two years after the ILC adopted a “knowingly” aids or
abets standard in the Draft Code, in 1998 the Rome Statute
seemingly adopted a purpose standard.151 Article 25(3)(c) states
that an individual will be criminally responsible and liable for
punishment if that person “for the purpose of facilitating the
commission of a [crime within the jurisdiction of the court], aids,
abets or otherwise assists in its commission or its attempted
145.
146.

Jacobson, supra note 65, at 205.
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT–98–33–A, Appeals Judgment, ¶¶
134–43 (Apr. 19, 2004); Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT–95–17/1–T, Trial
Chamber Judgment, ¶ 238 (Dec. 10 1998) at 242–244.
147. Furundzija, Case No. IT–95–17/1–T ¶ 227.
148. Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, art. 2, ¶
3 (1996).
149. Id.
150. Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 250–
51 (2d Cir. 2009).
151. See Cassel, supra note 53, at 310.
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commission, including providing the means for its
commission.”152 Judge Katzmann and the Second Circuit rely
heavily on this language as the basis for their conclusions that
aiding and abetting under international law requires a mens rea
of purpose.153
However, Judge Katzmann and the Second Circuit fail to
address a separate provision of Article 25 which provides an
alternative basis of liability. Article 25(3)(d) concerns crimes
committed by a “group of persons” acting with a “common
purpose.”154 It provides that anyone who contributes to the
commission of a crime by this group of persons “with the aim of
furthering the criminal activity” or with the “knowledge of the
intention of the group to commit the crime” will be held
criminally responsible.155 Thus, the Rome Statute “embraces a
‘knowledge’ test as sufficient to impose criminal responsibility
on one who aids and abets a group crime.”156 Therefore, the
reliance of the Second Circuit on the Rome Statute establishing
the requisite expression of customary law to support a purpose
mens rea for aiding and abetting in ATS cases is severely
undermined.
4. State Practice
a. Australia
In Australia, as a result of laws adopted pursuant to its
obligations under the Rome Statute, criminal accessory liability
attaches to a corporation when it acts as an aider or abettor.157
A similar standard of aiding and abetting applies to civil actions
in Australia and liability extends to any person “besides the
actual perpetrator . . . who ‘aid and abets,’ whether or not he
actively intervenes. Knowingly assisting, encouraging or merely

152. Rome Statute, supra note 80, at art. 25.3(c). For a thorough discussion of
the drafting and ratification history of the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court see Cassel, supra note 53, at 310–14.
153. See Talisman, 582 F.3d at 258–59; Talisman I, 453 F.Supp.2d at 277
(Katzmann, J. concurring).
154. Rome Statute, supra note 80, at art. 25.3(d).
155. Rome Statute, supra note 80, at art. 25.3(c); see also Cassel, supra note 53,
at 313.
156. Cassel, supra note 53.
157. See Adam McBeth, Crushed by an Anvil: A Case Study of Responsibility for
Human Rights in the Extractive Sector, 11 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 127, 149–52
(2008).
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being present as a conspirator at the commission of the wrong
would suffice.”158 Therefore, Australian civil law is plainly in
accord with the customary international standard of applying a
mens rea standard of knowledge for aiding and abetting
liability.159
b. United States
In Military Commission Instruction (MCI) No. 2, the United
States recognized that international law specifically defines the
scope of aiding and abetting liability. Although the jurisdiction
of MCI No. 2 extends only to offenders who are triable in a
military commission,160 this articulation of aiding and abetting
liability should be considered as persuasive by courts
determining the scope of such liability under the ATS. The MCI
constitutes a form of State practice and the document purports
to be “declarative of the existing law” of armed conflict.161
Furthermore, because the actions at issue in the Talisman case
occurred during a period of civil war in the Sudan,162 they
occurred during a period of armed conflict, thus making the
aiding and abetting standard enunciated in MCI No. 2
particularly relevant when assessing Talisman’s liability under
the ATS.163 According to MCI No. 2, aiding and abetting consists
of “in any . . . way facilitating the commission” of an offense,
with knowledge the act would aid or abet.164 Hence, according to
United States law, a showing of knowingly aiding and abetting
would result in liability under Military Commission Instruction
No. 2 and should also be sufficient to demonstrate liability
under the ATS.165

158. Lillian Manzella, EarthRights International, The International Law
Standard for Corporate Aiding and Abetting Liability 8, available at
http://www.earthrights .org/publication/unsrg-international-law-standard-corporateaiding-and-abetting-liability at 16 (quoting J. Fleming, THE LAW OF TORTS 230).
159. See McBeth, supra note 157 at 139..
160. Military Commission Instruction No. 2, art. 3(a) (2003), available at
http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/policy/dod/d20030430milcominstno2.p
df.
161. See id.
162. See id., Part I.A.1.
163. See id.(as the law of armed conflict).
164. Military Commission Instruction No.2, art. 6(c)(1) (2003), available at
http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/policy/dod/d20030430milcominstno2.p
df.
165. Id.
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c. South Africa
The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission
recognized culpability for those that were complicit in the
apartheid regime.166 This Commission unequivocally extended
culpability for the human rights violations that occurred under
the apartheid system based on a mens rea of knowledge.167 For
example, the Commission found high-ranking government
officials in the executive branch to be morally and politically
responsible for the human rights violations committed under
the apartheid system due to the “knowledge they had . . . or the
knowledge they are presumed to have had . . . about the gross
violations of human rights.”168 Those companies that actively
aided in the design and implementation of apartheid policies
were guilty of the highest level of culpability.169 However, those
that knew that their products or services would be used for
repression, such as banks and weapons manufacturers, were
also found to be guilty of involvement in the apartheid regime
and morally culpable for its atrocities.170 Hence, in accord with
the customary international law standard, the Commission held
corporations culpable when they knowingly provided practical
assistance, encouragement, or moral support to those principals
who were engaged in violations of international law.171
V. CONCLUSION
In Talisman, the Second Circuit was called upon to
determine the appropriate mens rea standard for aiding and
abetting under the ATS. According to the Supreme Court’s
decision in Sosa, causes of action brought under the ATS must
be based on customary international law. Thus, the ATS
provides federal courts with the jurisdiction to hear such
disputes and customary international law provides the cause of
action. Relying substantially on Judge Katzmann’s concurring
166. See 6 TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA, REPORT,
§ 5 ch. 2, ¶ 17 (2003) [hereinafter TRC REPORT].
167. Id. ¶ 17(b).
168. Id.
169. Manzella, supra note 158, at 9 (citing 4 TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION
COMMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA, REPORT, ch. 2 (1998) (noting that Commission
classified different levels of culpability for businesses complicit in the apartheid
regime).
170. Id.
171. Id.
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opinion in Khulumani, the Second Circuit came to the erroneous
conclusion that aiding and abetting under international law
requires a mens rea of purpose. In fact, customary international
law dictates that a mens rea of knowledge is all that is required
for aiding and abetting liability.
This conclusion is supported by the decisions of
international tribunals, such as the Nuremburg Tribunals
following World War II and the more recent ICTR and ICTY, in
cases concerning both individual and corporate defendants.
Additionally, international instruments such as the ILC Draft
Code explicitly state that the appropriate mens rea is knowledge
rather than purpose. Although the Rome Statute of the ICC
purportedly endorses a purpose mens rea standard, a fact relied
upon heavily by the Second Circuit, another section of the Rome
Statute creates an alternative basis of liability for complicity
based on knowledge. Furthermore, several of the States that
have addressed the issue have concluded that knowledge is the
appropriate mens rea standard for aiding and abetting.
Ultimately, a mens rea standard of knowledge is established by
customary international law as the requisite for aiding and
abetting liability. Therefore, for the purposes of ATS litigation,
courts should apply a knowledge mens rea when assessing
liability for aiding and abetting.

